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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
Lorne S. Clark* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We Canadians consider that there is no more significant aspect 
of our national interest than control over, and development of, our 
natural resources. This is partly because Canada has a greater per-
centage of its resources owned by foreign corporations than any 
other industrialized nation in the world. 1 It is therefore not surpris-
ing that we share at least some of the views enunciated by the 
majority of developing nations in the international community 
-most of which have been granted their independence in the 
post-World War IT period-on important matters such as regula-
tion of foreign investment and the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 
In company with these emerging countries, Canada does not yet 
have the domestic financial means to exploit our resources without 
the importation of investment capital from abroad. Despite our reli-
ance on outside investment, Canada, unlike the developing nations, 
has one of the highest standards of living in the world, a high level 
of education, and is clearly an industrialized society with increasing 
proportions of secondary and tertiary economic activity. 
Being both developed and developing, Canada holds a unique 
position. We tend to view international legal initiatives in the field 
of natural resources with a perspective different from many states, 
which have more of a vested interest in the arguments put forward 
by either the capital-exporting or the capital-importing nations. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
A. Development of the Principle of "Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources" 
The central forum for discussion of this subject by members of 
the world community has been the United Nations. Initially, the 
dialogue at the United Nations was concerned with the question of 
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources." This issue was first 
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raised during the ~ebates on human rights in 1952. 2 At that time, 
the world organization was concerned with the formulation of prin-
ciples of self-determination in connection with the human rights 
Covenants then being elaborated. In this context, permanent sover-
eignty over natural wealth emerged as an attribute of the principle 
of economic self-determination. 
For reasons that can be readily appreciated, this concept 
quickly became enmeshed with the subject of colonialism, the head-
line item of the day (and an inevitable development in the early 
1950's). The U.N. discussions at that time led to polarization be-
tween the developing, capital-importing states, with support from 
the Eastern European bloc, and the developed, capital-exporting 
nations. This polarization is a good example of the linkage between 
international legal aspects of natural resource ownership and devel-
opment, on the one hand, and relevant international political impli-
cations, on the other. Both must be taken into account when consid-
ering the matter from other than a strictly national point of view. 
The Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) eventually adopted Resolution 5233 of January 12, 1952, 
concerning economic development in general and commercial agree-
ments in particular. Of special interest is one of the clauses in the 
preamble: 
Considering that the under-developed countries have the right to 
determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they 
must utilize such resources in order to be in a better position to 
further the realization of their plans of economic development 
4 
and an operative clause which 
{r]ecommends that Members of the United Nations, within the 
framework of their general economic policy, should 
(b) Consider the possibility of facilitating through commercial 
agreements: 
(ii) The development of natural resources .... 
provided that such commercial agreements shall not contain eco-
nomic or political conditions violating the sovereign rights of the 
2. See, e.g., 6 U.N. GAOR 501-20 (1952). 
3. Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements, G.A. Res. 523, 6 
U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. N2119 (1952). 
4. Id. 
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underdeveloped countries, including the right to determine their 
own plans for economic development. 5 
Following further debates, on December 21, 1952, the Seventh 
Session of the UNGA adopted the landmark Resolution 626 entitled 
Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, which af-
firmed the right of Member States "freely to use and exploit their 
natural wealth and resources wherever deemed desirable by them 
for their own progress and economic development . . . . "6 
The Ninth Session of the UNGA further refined the concept of 
permanent sovereignty in its Resolution 837 of December 14, 1954, 
which 
[r]equests the Commission on Human Rights to complete its rec-
ommendations concerning international respect for the right of peo-
ples and nations to self-determination, including recommendations 
concerning their permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources, having due regard to the rights and duties of States 
under international law and to the importance of encouraging inter-
national co-operation in the economic development of under-
developed countries . . . . 7 
The important debate on whether a nation's permanent sover-
eignty over its resources was to be qualified in any way by the rights 
and obligations of states under international law was taken up again 
at the Thirteenth Session of the UNGA. At that time, Resolution 
1314 of December 12, 1958 was adopted, establishing a nine-member 
Commission to 
conduct a full survey of the status of this basic constituent of the 
right to self-determination ... [including] the status of the per-
manent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth 
and resources . . . . 8 
The Commission met for the first time in May 1959. Its deliber-
ations, the discussions in the Economic and Social Council, and 
debates in the UNGA, especially those at the Seventeenth Session 
in 1962, eventually led to the adoption on December 14, 1962 of the 
5. Id. ~ 1. 
6. G.A. Res. 626, ~ 1, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 18, U.N. Doc. N2361 (1952). 
7. Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and 
Nations to Self-determination, G.A. Res. 837, ~ 1, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 21, U.N. Doc. 
N2890 (1954). 
8. G.A. Res. 1314, ~ l, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 27, U.N. Doc. N4090 (1958) . 
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Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
(Declaration). 9 
The Declaration positively reaffirms four basic principles of 
international law: (1) compensation must be paid in the event of a 
lawful taking of rights and property; (2) such compensation must 
be paid in accordance with international law, that is, it must meet 
international legal standards; (3) arbitration agreements between 
states and private parties have a binding effect; 10 and (4) invest-
ment agreements between states and private parties have a binding 
effect. 11 
It is useful to note the objective of the Declaration: it endeavors 
to determine the nature of the right of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, the manner in which that right should be exer-
cised, and what measures should be taken into account in accord-
ance with international law. 
UNGA resolutions are not, in themselves, binding under inter-
national law. 12 However, the Declaration seeks to enshrine the rights 
of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources. It is the considered view of many interna-
tional lawyers that the Declaration, far from creating new law, 
merely reaffirms existing international law. 13 
After more than a decade of discussion and debate, it was clear 
that, with the adoption of the 1962 Declaration, the world com-
munity recognized and accepted as a principle of international law 
9. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962). 
10. Id. ~ 4. Paragraph 4 of the Resolution also states the prevailing view concerning 
nationalization as of 1962, and merits quoting in full: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or 
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as 
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such 
cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules 
in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in 
accordance with international law. In any case where the question of compensation 
gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures 
shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties 
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or interna-
tional adjudication . 
11. Id. ~ 8. 
12. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW or NATIONS 110 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963). 
13. See, e.g., Gess, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 13 lNT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 398, 409 (1964); Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 469 (1963); Vicuna, Some International Law 
Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. lNT'L L. 
711, 712 (1973). 
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that natural resources are the property of the state in the territory 
in which they are found, or come under the jurisdiction of the state 
upon which certain rights have been bestowed as a result of interna-
tional agreement. 14 
B. "Economic Rights and Duties of States" and "A New 
International Economic Order" 
Exactly one decade after the adoption of the Declaration on 
Permanent Sovereignty, U .N. activity in the area of natural re-
source control resumed with even greater intensity. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
adopted Resolution 45(1II) 15 on May 18, 1972, which called for agree-
ment on generally accepted norms to govern international economic 
relations in a systematic manner. The Resolution underscored the 
need for protection of the rights of all countries, especially the devel-
oping nations, and established a Working Group to begin drafting 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Charter). 16 On 
December 19, 1972, the UNGA agreed on the composition of the 
Working Group of governmental experts.17 The following year, the 
Working Group was urged by the Assembly to complete, as the first 
step in the process of codification and development, a final draft 
Charter to be considered and approved at the Twenty-ninth Session 
of the UNGA in 1974.18 
In May 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the UNGA adopted 
two resolutions, a Declaration and a Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order. 19 These res-
olutions emphasized that the proposed Charter was to constitute an 
effective instrument for moving towards the organization of a new 
system of international economic relations based on equity, sover-
eign equality, and interdependence of the interests of developed and 
developing countries. 
I will not address myself to the lengthy, complex, and at times 
14. See, e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1964] 1 
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964). 
15. UN CT AD Res. 45(Ill), 1 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 3 UNCTAD, Annex lA, at 58, U.N. Doc. TD/180 (1972). 
16. Id. ~ 1. 
17. G.A. Res. 3037, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 53, U.N. Doc. N8730 (1972). This 
Resolution enlarged the Working Group from 31 to 40 members. 
18. G.A. Res. 3082, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 40, U.N. Doc. N9030 (1973). 
19. G.A. Res . 3201, 3202, 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 
(1974). 
5
Clark: International Law and Resources
Published by SURFACE, 1977
382 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 4:377 
convoluted negotiations, discussions, and debates which finally re-
sulted in Resolution 3281 of December 12, 1974, which adopted the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.20 These have been 
dealt with in detail by a number of eminent international lawyers 
in recent publications.21 Suffice it to say that during the elaboration 
of the Charter the international political implications of the subject 
in many ways overshadowed the relevant international legal as-
pects, much as the colonialism issue had adversely affected the 
initial consideration of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources in the early 1950's. On the final roll call vote in the UNGA, 
the Charter Resolution passed by a vote of 120 to 6 (including the 
United States), with 10 abstentions (including Canada).22 A degree 
of polarization on substance remains, although a great deal of effort 
was expended at the final meeting of the Working Group and in the 
UNGA in an attempt to negotiate a text acceptable to all Member 
States. 
Much of the Charter language did receive unanimous support. 
The provisions which did not secure general approbation, however, 
deal with: (1) the treatment of foreign investment, (2) international 
trade policy, and ( 3) development assistance policy. 23 Of these three 
areas, the most controversial and the one of most interest to us in 
reviewing natural resource law is the treatment of foreign invest-
ment, including the control of foreign-based multinational corpora-
tions and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
In examining some of the difficulties, it should be noted that 
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order, 
which expanded upon the 1962 Permanent Sovereignty Declaration, 
had asserted the "[f]ull permanent sovereignty of every State over 
its natural resources and all economic activities."24 Article 2, para-
20. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
21. See, e.g., Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A 
Refiection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); Lillich, Economic 
Coercion and the International Economic Order, 51 INT'L AFF. 358 (1975). 
22. The six negative votes were cast by Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, United States, and Belgium. The abstaining nations were Austria, Canada, 
France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. 29 U.N. GAOR 
44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). 
23. G.A. Res. 3281, arts. 2, 4, 6, 8, 14, 22; 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (197 4). For the text of the final draft of the Resolution by the Second Committee, the 
proposed amendments, and the votes thereon, see U.N. Docs. A/C.2/L.1386, 1398-1415, 1419, 
reprinted in 29 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, at 1-31, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). 
24. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3201, ~ 4(3), 6 Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
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graph 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
purports to extend the application of the "permanent sovereignty" 
concept to ,·'all [a state's] wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities. " 25 The absence of any provision limiting the territorial 
application of this concept permits the interpretation that a state 
which transfers a portion of its wealth abroad, for example in the 
form of foreign investment, still retains "permanent sovereignty" 
over that wealth. This would conflict with the "permanent sover-
eignty" of the host state over its "economic activities." The Charter 
provision can thus be read as internally inconsistent. Efforts to 
introduce into the text some limitation of the concept of permanent 
sovereignty, originally put forward in the context of control over 
foreign-owned natural resources, were not successful.26 
Article 2, paragraph 2(a) asserts the right of every state "[t]o 
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its 
national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations," 
and provides further that "[n]o State shall be compelled to grant 
preferential treatment to foreign investment. " 27 While Canada did 
not advocate preferential treatment for foreign investment, we did 
take the view that 
when a host State takes measures against foreign investment, it 
should not discriminate against Canadian foreign investment in re-
lation to foreign investment from other sources, and the measures 
which it applies to all foreign investment should be in accordance 
with its international obligations. 28 
The issues of nationalization and compensation dealt with in 
Article 2, paragraph 2(c) 29 proved to be incapable of a generally ac-
ceptable solution. Article 2 states: 
2. Every State has the right: 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by 
the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
25. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 1, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
26. See note 32 infra and accompanying text. 
27. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 2(a), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974). 
28. 29 U.N . GAOR 56, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). See also 29 U.N. GAOR, C.2, 1649th 
meeting 446, ~ 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.1649 (1974). 
29. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2, ~ 2(c), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 
(1974). 
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pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise 
to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the 
nationalizing State and by its tribunals unless it is freely and mu-
tually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be 
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accord-
ance with the principle of free choice of means. 30 
This position raises most clearly the fundamental issue of the rela-
tionship of international law to the treatment of foreign investment. 
The Canadian position was that not only the right of nationalization 
was conditioned upon payment of compensation, but that the whole 
of Article 2 was inherently defective because of the absence of any 
reference to the applicabilty of international law.31 After the at-
tempt by a group of 14 developed states, including Canada, to se-
cure agreement on a substitute provision was voted down, 32 the Ca-
nadian representative in the General Assembly stated: 
The reason my delegation attaches such importance to this point is 
that, if we are to achieve and maintain the equitable distribution 
of the world's wealth which this charter is intended to promote, a 
significant flow of private capital from developed to developing 
countries in the form of investment will be required. This movement 
of capital will take place only in conditions which provide at least a 
certain degree of security-which cannot possibly exist if the rule of 
law is rejected. 33 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States cannot, 
as had been originally hoped, take its place alongside the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 194834 and the Declaration of Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the 
United Nations of 197035 as expressing a consensus of the interna-
tional community. However, it cannot be denied that the document 
30. Id. 
31. 29 U.N. GAOR 57, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). See also 29 U.N. GAOR, C.2, 1649th 
meeting 446, ~~ 46-47, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.1649 (1974). 
32. For the text of the substitute Article 2, see U.N. Doc. A/C.2/L.1404, reprinted in 29 
U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 48, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1974). Article 2, para-
graph 3 of the substitute was voted down by 71 against, 20 in favor, 18 abstaining; while 
Article 2, paragraphs 1, 2 were defeated by 87 against, 19 in favor, 11 abstaining. Id. at 10. 
33. 29 U.N . GAOR 58, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974). 
34. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
35. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
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is nevertheless an important milestone in the rapidly evolving 
framework of economic relations between the developed and devel-
oping countries. The position asserted in the Charter concerning the 
relationship of international law to foreign investment is therefore 
most unfortunate. 
However, it is still possible that the need to attract foreign 
investment capital as part of the economic development process will 
give rise to state practice, at least with respect to future investment, 
so as to reassert the fundamental role of international law in this 
area. Whether such state practice will reestablish the erstwhile 
classical concept of equitable and effective compensation, as deter-
mined by international dispute settlement machinery dealing with 
nationalization, is perhaps more problematical. 
From my remarks you will have noted that, from a Canadian 
point of view, U .N. developments in the field of sovereignty over 
natural resources and foreign investment have been less than fully 
satisfactory. U.N. Declarations and Charters may be debated, elab-
orated, and voted on, but as long as there is no universal organiza-
tion with binding legislative authority, and the nation-state remains 
the quintessential subject of the international legal order, municipal 
or national law, relevant treaties and other agreements, and cus-
tomary international law will govern. 
C. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation 
In looking ahead to future developments, there is a need to keep 
in view the North-South Dialogue, which is being conducted in 
Paris. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation 
(CIEC) 36 is a one-year attempt on the part of 27 industrialized and 
developing countries to explore approaches to the problems of en-
ergy and to refine further the "New International Economic Order" 
through energizing or stimulating action in such organizations as 
UNCTAD, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (World Bank), and the Food and 
Agricultural Organization. This initiative is seen by participating 
states, including Canada, as a unique opportunity to address the 
various demands recently put forward by the developing countries 
36. The work of the CIEC is discussed at 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 388-94 (1976) . The 
General Assembly has requested U .N. organizations to actively assist the participants in the 
CIEC. G.A. Res. 3515, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 34, at 70, U.N. Doc. N10034 (1975). 
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for changes in the world's economic system. 
The CIEC is not an international lawmaking forum, but is the 
embodiment of an exercise in considerable political will, and as such 
can be expected to influence future international law in several 
areas. Its limited but representative membership will tend to ensure 
that any consensus reached in the Conference will be broadly ac-
ceptable to the international community at large. This may also 
make it possible to replace the highly politicized and often sterile 
debates on international economic problems with a more pragmatic 
and systematic approach to these complex questions, which cannot 
be resolved by mere rhetoric. 
Of particular relevance to the subject before us is the Commis-
sion on Raw Materials, one of four Commissions within the CIEC. 
This Commission has the responsibility of reviewing the progress 
made in other international forums. It has been entrusted with facil-
itating the establishment of reenforcement of arrangements which 
may seem advisable in the field of raw materials (including food-
stuffs), which are of particular interest to developing countries.37 
It should be emphasized that the four Commissions do not 
operate in isolation. The other three-on energy, development, and 
financial affairs-might well take up resource issues from such other 
perspectives as trade policy, technology assistance for development 
of resources, or the implications for the emerging international eco-
nomic structure. International economic relations have not been 
static since the adoption of the Economic Charter in 197 4 and the 
holding of the last two Special Sessions of the U .N. General Assem-
bly. 
III. THE CANADIAN DOMESTIC RESPONSE 
A. The Foreign Investment Review Act 
In Canada, the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA)38 and its 
attendant regulatory system are of critical relevance. The back-
ground to, and workings of, this new system were discussed by emi-
nent experts at another panel here this morning. It might, however, 
be helpful to reiterate some pertinent details. The first phase of the 
FIRA was proclaimed in force on April 9, 197 4; the second phase 
came into force on October 15, 1975. Foreign investment in Canada 
37. Memorandums for the Preparatory Meeting for the Conference of International Eco-
nomic Cooperation, October 13, 1975, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS, 390-91 (1976). 
38. Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. c. 46 (1973). 
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therefore is now operating in the new climate of regulation created 
by this important statute. 
The key applicable principle is that foreign-controlled busi-
nesses in Canada should operate in ways that bring "significant 
benefit" to Canada.39 To this end they are expected to pursue poli-
cies which foster their independence from the head office in their 
decision-making and enhance their innovative and other entrepre-
neurial capabilities, their efficiency, and their identification with 
Canada and the needs and aspirations of the Canadian people. It 
should be made clear that Canada is not in any way trying to dis-
courage foreign enterprises, multinational or otherwise, from invest-
ing in our country. On the contrary, as has been emphasized, Can-
ada continues to require capital importation to sustain our high 
level of industrialization and our standard of living. However, our 
central concern is that investment be of significant benefit to Can-
ada. 
By the end of 1973, cumulative direct foreign investment in 
Canada totaled $32.8 billion.40 Despite our much smaller popula-
tion, this figure is 79 percent greater than the $18.3 billion of cumu-
lative direct foreign investment in the United States at the end of 
1973.41 
The FIRA requires the Canadian government to review pro-
posed foreign investment in new businesses and anticipated expan-
sion of existing foreign-controlled firms into unrelated areas. Of the 
initial 230 applications reviewed, only 12 were disallowed, while 17 
were withdrawn. 42 The first Annual Report on the operation of FIRA 
highlights a number of benefits to Canada accruing from the new 
screening process: 7 ,000 new jobs, over $500 million in new invest-
ment, increased exports, more purchases of Canadian goods and 
services, improved efficiency and technology, strengthened research 
and development, and a greater variety of goods and services pro-
duced in Canada. 43 
In looking at these beneficial effects of the operation of FIRA, 
it must be borne in mind that, on the resource side, three-quarters 
39. Id. § 2. 
40. Statistics Canada Daily, Sept. 30, 1975, at 2. Of this total, $25.5 billion, or 78 
percent, came from U.S. investors. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1976 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 828, table 1396. 
41. 1976 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 40, at 829, table 1398. 
Of this total, $4.0 billion, or 22 percent, came from Canadian investors. Id. 
42. [1974-75) FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. AGENCY ANN. REP. 23 (1975). 
43. Id. at 1. 
11
Clark: International Law and Resources
Published by SURFACE, 1977
388 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 4:377 
of the Canadian oil and natural gas industry44 and about two-thirds 
of the Canadian mining and smelting industry remain under nonres-
ident control. 45 If these figures are to stay that high, the trade-offs 
in "significant benefits" to Canada will also have to be substantial. 
B. Petro-Canada 
On January 1, 1976, our new national petroleum company, 
Petro-Canada, officially went into business. 46 Although oil interests 
in the United States are well represented by private petroleum 
companies (the "seven sisters" have been the subject of no little 
publicity since the 1973 oil embargo), more than a dozen nations 
have chosen to have their hydrocarbon interests managed by wholly 
or partially owned national corporations.47 We are hopeful that 
Petro-Canada can provide similar benefits for us. Meanwhile, Bri-
tish Petroleum, Ltd., which is nearly half-owned by the British 
government, has about 15 percent of the market in Canada's two 
largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec. Should we not be able to 
compete with such companies on even terms in our own country? 
IV. CONCLUSION: CANADIAN VIEWS IN PERSPECTIVE 
While we are examining national control over resources, eco-
nomic rights and duties of states, and a new, emerging resource and 
economic nationalism in Canada, care must be taken to put the 
Canadian case into perspective. Our boisterous, self-congratulatory 
centennial celebrations in 1967 (with its highlight, Expo '67 in Mon-
treal) marked not only a period of festivity but also a national rea-
wakening. Over the previous 100 years we were a relatively open 
country-open to trade, to foreign ownership, and to investment. 
Investment, mainly from the United Kingdom in the early years, 
then primarily from the United States, was a central factor in our 
development as a nation. 48 
Confederation in 1867 found Canada with a tiny population on 
a vast land mass. In order to harness and exploit the abundant 
natural resources, a nationwide railroad and communications net-
44. GRAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19, 20. 
45. Id. 
46. Petro-Canada was created by the Petro-Canada Act, Can. Stat. c. 61 (1975). 
47. The most notable of these are, of course, the 13 members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait , Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela . 
48. GRAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. 
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work was required. Yet, after more than a century of development 
the majority of Canada's resource industries are still foreign-
owned.49 A heightened awareness of the extent of nonresident eco-
nomic domination has been coupled with a growing appreciation on 
the part of Canadians that Canada is by no means a limitless store-
house of natural wealth awaiting only the drill, oil rig, or mine shaft. 
At the same time, there is developing an increasing conscious-
ness about the land itself, and of the responsibility to future genera-
tions for the stewardship of its resources and the environment. Most 
Canadians have always had an attachment to and fascination with 
the unspoiled wilderness around them. An hour by car from any city 
in Canada will take one to lakes, rivers, forests, or mountains. 
Pressures have grown to regulate land ownership, especially 
ownership of recreational property, by non-Canadians and even by 
nonresidents of particular provinces, so that speculative investment 
does not distort land values and create social strains, and to avoid 
a situation where Canadians will not have access to the choicest 
property in our own country.50 The land is of course the most pre-
cious of natural resources, and several provinces in Canada have 
legislated to regulate its disposition in the interests of their people, 51 
while others have the issue under careful study. 
In both Canada and the United States, the finite nature of our 
resource inheritance is increasingly appreciated, and this has raised 
similar concerns about availability in relation to national needs. In 
Canada this realization is matched by a desire to improve the eco-
nomic benefit to Canadians from the export of our nonrenewable 
resources. We are now seeking to take fuller advantage of opportuni-
ties for refining, processing, and manufacturing in our own country. 
We can no longer welcome trading propositions in which access to 
our major markets for finished goods is sought, while tariffs are 
erected by our trading partners to discourage Canadian raw mate-
rial exports, except in the most unprocessed form. Thus we look to 
the current Geneva negotiations of the Tokyo Round of the GATI 
for changes in tariff and nontariff barriers which will give Canada a 
fairer opportunity to process and manufacture her own products in 
Canada where it is economical to do so. 
But whether financing comes from domestic or foreign sources, 
49. Id. at 224. 
50. See, e.g., Bruce, Land Grab, MACLEAN's, May 1975, at 25. 
51. See, e.g., Land Transfer Tax Act of 1974, Ont. Stat. c. 8 (1974). 
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Canada is not looking for unrestricted growth and environmental 
havoc. The public hearings held to consider the effects on the fragile 
northern ecology of the construction of a pipeline to bring Canadian 
Arctic gas to southern markets underscored this concern. There is 
also serious 1 public concern about the hazards of supertanker traffic 
through the coastal waters of the three oceans which surround Can-
ada.52 This is particularly true of the Pacific coast, where the risks 
of a major oil spill in the waters off British Columbia from tankers 
bringing Alaskan oil into Puget Sound continue to cause apprehen-
sion. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to develop comprehensive 
environmental protection regimes must be encouraged and pro-
moted so as to provide a viable international legal basis for preserv-
ing such ecologically sensitive areas. 
In concluding these remarks, which have dealt with only some 
of the significant aspects of the subject under examination, it is 
appropriate to note that natural resource law, as it is emerging in 
national legal systems and in the context of the existing and future 
international legal order, is indeed a fascinating area for study and 
research. Its importance cannot be exaggerated. The almost over-
whelming task of enhancing current knowledge and expertise is a 
challenge to which international lawyers can and will rise, to the 
benefit of their own countries and to the credit of their profession. 
52. This concern was manifested by the passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act, CAN. R.Ev. STAT., 1st Supp., c. 2 (1970). 
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